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Abstract
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications (apps) provide convenient and
low cost means for users to communicate and share information with each other
in real-time. Day by day, the popularity of such apps is increasing, and people
produce and share a huge amount of data, including their personal and sensitive
information. This might lead to several privacy issues, such as revealing user
contacts, private messages or personal photos. Therefore, having an up-to-date
forensic understanding of these apps is necessary.
This chapter presents analysis of forensically valuable remnants of three pop-
ular Mobile VoIP (mVoIP) apps on Google Play store, namely: Viber, Skype,
and WhatsApp Messenger, in order to figure out to what extent these apps re-
veal forensically valuable information about the users activities. We performed
a thorough investigative study of these three mVoIP apps on smartphone de-
vices. Our experimental results show that several artefacts, such as messages,
contact details, phone numbers, images, and video files, are recoverable from
the smartphone device that is equipped with these mVoIP apps.
Keywords: Android Forensics, mVoIP, Viber, Skype, WhatsApp Messenger,
Digital Forensics
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, we have witnessed a rapid increase in the use of Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services as an online communication method on
mobile devices. This is not surprising due to the increasing penetration of smart-
phones: it has been predicted that by 2019 the number of smartphone users will
be more than 2.6 billion [1]. These days, people use their smartphone devices not
only for making voice calls and exchanging SMS, but also for obtaining several
services which are offered due to ubiquitous access to Internet, such as mobile
banking, and location-based services. Meantime, the use of VoIP applications,
which could be delivered easily through mobile VoIP applications (mVoIP apps),
would enable people to interact, share information, and to become socialized at
a very low cost compared to most of the traditional communication techniques.
However, such applications could also be exploited by criminals or be targeted
by cybercriminals (e.g., with malware infection to steal financial data) [2, 3]. For
these reasons, mobile devices (including smartphones) attracted a lot of atten-
tion from the security research community [4], in particular from the perspective
of malware [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], security enforcement [13, 14, 15, 16], and
authentication mechanisms [17, 18, 19].
Smartphones are a common source of evidence in both criminal investiga-
tions and civil litigations [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. However, the constant evo-
lution and nature (e.g., closed source operating system and diverse range of
proprietary hardware) of mobile devices and mobile apps complicates forensic
investigations [26]. Among the existing smartphone operating systems in the
market, Android dominated the market with more than 80% of the total mar-
ket share in 2015 Q2 [27, 28]. Therefore, Android popularity attracted several
researchers to focus on investigating several different security aspects of An-
droid, ranging from user identification [29, 30], feasibility of encryption methods
on Android [31], cloud storage apps forensics [32], and social networking apps
forensics [3]. Due to the increasing use of mVoIP apps for malicious activities on
different platforms including Android, forensic investigation of such apps needs
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an extensive coverage [33, 34], and therefore in this chapter, we provide an in-
vestigative study of the three popular VoIP apps for Android on Google Play
(see Table 1), namely:Viber [35], Skype [36], and WhatsApp [37]. The features
of these VoIP apps are summarized in Table 2. In particular, we aim to answer
the following question: “What artifacts of forensic value can be recovered from
the use of Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp Android apps?”.
Table 1: Number of installations for each application [35, 36, 37].
Application Number of Google Play Downloads
and Installations as of March-2016
Viber 100,000,000 - 500,000,000
Skype 500,000,000 - 1,000,000,000
WhatsApp 1,000,000,000 - 5,000,000,000
Table 2: Features of mVoIP applications.
Features Viber Skype WhatsApp
Text-chat X X X
Send and Receive Image X X X
Send and Receive Video X X X
Send and Receive Audio X X X
Incoming and Outgoing Calls X X X
Group Call X
Group Chat X X X
V-Card and Contact Sharing X
2. RELATED WORK
These days, several trusted and untrusted providers lunch various category
of applications for mobile devices. This has lead to the ever increasing trend
in using mobile devices in order to benefit from the services offered by these
applications. This tendency motivated the forensic community to concentrate
on forensic investigation of the mobile devices. In this regard, Dezfoli et al. [26]
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perused the future trends in digital investigation and determined that mobile
phone forensics is receiving more and more attention by the community and is
one of the fastest growing fields. In [38], the authors provided a comprehensive
discussion on the nature of digital evidence on mobile devices, along with a
complete guide on forensic techniques to handle, preserve, extract and analyze
evidence from mobile devices. Moreover, they presented examples of commercial
forensic tools that can be used to obtain data from mobile phones, such as Access
Data Forensic Toolkit (FTK), Cellebrite Physical, XACT, along with use case
example of the adopted Digital Forensic Framework (DDF) plug-in. In the same
line of study, Mohtasebi and Dehghantanha [39] presented a unified framework
for investigation of different types of smartphone devices. Parvez et al. [40]
proposed a forensics framework for investigation of Samsung Phones. Several
researchers have proposed various frameworks for the investigation of Nokia
mobile devices and Firefox OS [41, 25].
A comparison of forensic evidence recovery techniques for a Windows Mo-
bile smartphone demonstrates that there are different techniques to acquire
and decode information of potential forensic interest from a Windows Mobile
smartphone [42]. Furthermore, forensic examination of the Windows Mobile
device database (the pim.vol) file confirmed that pim.vol contains informa-
tion related to contacts, call history, speed-dial settings, appointments, and
tasks [43]. Moreover, in [44], the authors provided a number of possible meth-
ods of acquiring and examining data on Windows Mobile devices, as well as
the locations of potentially useful data, such as text messages, multimedia, e-
mail, Web browsing artefacts and Registry entries. They also used MobileSpy
monitoring software as a case-example to highlight the importance for forensic
analysis. They showed that the existence of such a malicious monitoring soft-
ware on a Windows phone could be detectable on the device being investigated
by forensics analyst. In another recent study, Yang et al. [45] carried out an
investigative study on two popular Windows instant messaging apps, i.e., Face-
book and Skype. The authors showed that several artefacts are recoverable,
such as contact lists, conversations, and transferred files.
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A research project published in DFRWS 2010 Annual Conference discussed
technical issues which are in place when capturing Android physical memory [46].
A critical review of seven years of mobile device forensics [47] demonstrated that,
there are several research studies in the area of Android device forensics in the
literature. However, very few of them support the varying levels of Android
memory investigation. Lessard and Kessler [48] showed that it is possible to ac-
quire a logical image of Android-based smartphones, such as Samsung Galaxy,
using either a logical method or a physical method. The logical acquisition
technique consists of obtaining a binary image of the device’s memory, which
requires root access to the device. More so, Vidas et al. [49] discussed an acqui-
sition methodology based on overwriting the “Recovery” partition on the An-
droid device’s SD card with specialized forensic acquisition software. Likewise,
Canlar et al. [21] proposed LiveSD Forensics, which is an on-device live data
acquisition approach for Windows Mobile Devices. They proposed a method to
obtain artefacts from both the Random-Access Memory (RAM) and the Elec-
tronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM). In [50], the
authors proposed a methodology for collection and analysis of evidential data
on Android devices, which used the principles of Martini and Choo’s cloud
forensics framework [51]. The steps within this methodology are as follows: the
collection of the physical image of the device partitions with the aid of a live
OS bootloader, and the examination of app files in private and external storage,
app databases and accounts data for all apps of interest, on the android device.
Using this methodology, in [52], the authors carried out an analysis of seven
popular Android apps within three categories: storage (Dropbox, OneDrive,
Box and ownCloud), note-taking (Evernote and OneNote) and password sync-
ing (Universal Password Manager,UPM). Such analysis proves the validity of
their proposed methodology.
In order to facilitate the forensic investigation of mobile devices that are
rapidly changing in their structure, Do et al. [53] proposed a forensically sound
adversary model. Azfar et al. [54] considered this adversary model as a template
to map a potential adversary’s capabilities and constraints, in order to evaluate
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the usefulness of such a model by carrying out a forensic analysis of five popular
Android social apps (Twitter, POF Dating, Snapchat, Fling and Pinterest).
They showed that useful artefacts are recoverable using this model, including
databases, user account information, contact lists, images and profile pictures.
They could also discover timestamps for notifications and tweets, as well as a
Facebook authentication token string used by the apps.
There is also a vast interest of digital investigators in studying the instant
messaging artefacts in the stream of research in this area of digital forensics.
The first claimed work to carry out a forensic analysis of Skype on the An-
droid platform [55] investigated both the NAND and RAM flash memories in
different scenarios. Their obtained results showed that chat and call patterns
can be found in both of NAND and RAM flash memories of mobile devices,
regardless of whether the Skype account has been signed out, signed in or even
after deleting the call history. In [34, 56], the authors showed that, whilst
conducting recoveries of digital evidences relating to VoIP applications in com-
puter systems, the Skype information is recoverable from the physical memory.
Moreover, [57] presents another forensic analysis of several instant messaging
applications including Skype and WhatsApp focusing on encryption algorithms
used by these applications. Similar work has also been conducted by forensi-
cally analyzing WhatsApp on Android platforms [58, 59]. In the same line of
study, a forensic analysis of four popular social networking applications (Face-
book, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+) have been carried out which showed that
artefacts useful as evidence in a potential criminal investigation are recoverable
from smartphone devices using such applications [3]. Moreover, Yang et al.,
suggested an approach for forensics investigation of instant messaging applica-
tions on Windows 8.1 and applied it for detecting remnants of Facebook Instant
Messaging and Skype application. Another important research direction which
has always been a concern for digital investigators in investigation of instant
messaging applications is privacy [60, 61, 62]. Ntantogian et al. [63] evaluated
thirteen Android mobile applications focusing on the privacy. They tried to
recover artefacts that provide information relating to authentication credentials.
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They showed that, the users’ credentials are recoverable in the majority of the
applications. Moreover, they determined specific patterns for the location of
such credentials within a memory dump. In another research study [64], Far-
den et al. explored the privacy of user data with regards to mobile apps usage
by evaluating the privacy risks that are inherent when using popular mobile dat-
ing Apps. They showed that in almost half of the investigated applications, the
chat messages are recoverable, and in some cases details of other nearby users
could also be extracted. Likewise, Azfar et al. [65] provided a forensic taxon-
omy of Android mHealth apps, by examination of 40 popular Android mHealth
apps. Their findings could potentially help facilitate forensic analysis of those
particular mobile health applications.
In this paper we thoroughly analyze forensics remnants of three popular
instant messaging applications namely Viber, Skype, andWhatsApp on Android
platform to provide a guideline for forensics practitioners in conducting similar
investigations. In compare with previous studies, this research is delving into
forensically valuable evidences in the context of Android platform and provides
a comparative study of different VoIP applications remnants. Moreover, it is
furthering forensics attention to lesser studied Viber andWhatsApp applications
forensics.
3. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Our investigative methodology is based on the digital forensic framework
proposed by Martini and Choo [51]. In this study, we first identified the po-
tential evidence sources and set up the experimental environment (Section 3.1).
Thereafter, we carry out logical acquisition in order to collect evidential data
(Section 3.2). Finally, by analyzing the collected data, we investigate possible
remnant artefacts (Section 3.3). We further demonstrated and discussed the
experimental results in Section 4, and presented the conclusions drawn from
our investigation in Section 5; both of which exemplify the third and fourth
steps of the framework methodology [51], i.e., ‘Examination and Analysis’ and
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‘Reporting and Presentation’, in which the results of the forensic study should
be analyzed and presented appropriately.
Due to the fact that without a rooting the smartphone device, we would not
be able to access some of the stored files (we will explain in Subsection 3.2), we
utilized a rooted Android phone, i.e., Samsung Galaxy S3 GT-i9300, in order to
conduct our experiments. We set up and configured necessary workstations and
tools (including both software and hardware), as listed in Table 3. Moreover,
Table 4 reports the authentication methods required for our considered mVoIP
applications, and their details.
Our examination and analysis process consist of three phases, which we
explain in the following.
Table 3: Adopted forensic tools.
Tool Version Details
Android Platform
Phone
Samsung S3 GT
- i9300, Firmware
version 3.0.31
Mobile Device used for this study
mVoIP Applica-
tions
Viber - 4.3.3
Skype - 4.9.0.45564
WhatsApp -
2.11.238
Applications that are investigated
AccessData FTK
Imager
V 3.1.4.6 Used to explore the acquired logical im-
age (internal memory) of the phone
SQLite Database
Browser
2.0bl Visual tool which is used to explore the
database extracted from each applica-
tion after identifying the folders using
AccessData FTK Imager
Internet Evidence
Finder Timeline
IEF v6.3 Provides a view of each artefact on a vi-
sual timeline without any need to con-
vert artefacts like timestamps
Root-Kit Frameware CF-
Auto-Root- m0
m0xx-gti9300
Frameware is used to root the device
Odin3 version 3.07 Enables uploading of the root-kit
frameware to the Android device
Epoch & Unix
Timestamp Con-
verter
Used to convert the timestamp found
in hex format
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3.1. Phase I- Setup Phase – First Iteration
The first phase of our study is to identify and preserve the source of evi-
dence, which is the first iteration. In this phase, we downloaded three mVoIP
applications from the Google Play Store and installed on a Samsung Galaxy S3
GT-i9300 smartphone. For WhatsApp and Viber applications, an active mobile
SIM is required to activate the application, while Skype could be activated by
the username and password of the registered account (see Table 4). For each ap-
plication, we performed several activities, as described in Table 5, continuously
for one month before the logical acquisition.
Table 4: Application details and authentication methods on the supported Android 4.3 Plat-
form.
mVoIP
Applications
Size Version Authentication
Method
Viber 20 MB 4.3.3 Mobile phone number
(e.g. +1 xxxxxx)
Skype 15 MB 4.9.0.45564 Username and
password
WhatsApp 15 MB 2.11.238 Mobile phone number
(e.g. +1 xxxxxx)
Table 5: Performed activities using the mVoIP applications.
Features Viber Skype WhatsApp
Text-chat X X X
Send Image X X X
Receive Image X X X
Send Video X X X
Receive Video X X X
Send Audio X X X
Receive Audio X X X
3.2. Phase II - Logical Acquisition
The smartphone device that we used for the experiments, i.e., Samsung
Galaxy S3 GT-i9300 Firmware version 3.0.31, was originally not rooted. How-
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ever, without a root access on the phone, many data files would be inacces-
sible. Therefore, we used Odin3 (version 3.07) tool [66] to root the device
by uploading the rook-kit frameware (CF-Auto-Root-m0-m0xx-gti9300) to the
device. The installed root-kit gives the user root access, i.e., the user has the
privilege control over the OS, which allows the user to attain privileged con-
trol within the Android’s sub-system, and bypass the limitation placed on the
device by the manufacturer. The root access grants the user the privilege to
access a certain protected directory that holds some of the artefacts needed
for this experiment (e.g., [root]/data/directories). The needed directory
is then backed up and later accessed with the use of other tools mentioned
earlier (see Table 3). The procedure that we adopted in our data acquisition
is forensically sound according to [49]; however, there are other methods to
acquire logical image on Android devices without having to root the device.
After rooting the phone, the bit-by-bit physical acquisition of dd image is ac-
quired using the following SSH command: ‘sshroot@(Device IP Address)
dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0p12 | of=(Location on your computer). The
“mmcblk0p12” (which might be different in several devices) is the internal mem-
ory block of the Android device, which is 16GB and so, it takes hours to be fully
acquired.
This phase of the experiments leads to acquisition of the logical image of
the Android device, which is considered to be the most crucial phase in mobile
forensics investigation process, as the generated hash values play a vital role
when presenting the case in court of law [67].
3.3. Phase III - Identification and Analysis – Second Iteration
This third phase of the experiment includes identification of folders and files
on the logical image acquired in the previous phase. Examination and analysis
of the files in order to check the existence of artefacts such as time-stamps,
location, GPS coordination, contact info, text-chat, SMS, file location and any
significant data that could be relevant to the research area. We conducted
forensic examinations manually, with the aid of the tools listed in the Table 3.
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After acquiring the logical image, as described in Phase II, we used “AccessData
FTK Imager” to analyze the acquired dd image which resulted in the creation of
the directory default path. This allows us to access all the files in each directory,
and therefore navigating to each one of the files. Figure 1 shows the three folders
of the our three under investigation applications, Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp
Messenger. After identifying these folders, in the next step, we need to carry
out a deep inspection on each application’s database to know whether we can
find any potential evidentiary artefact.
Figure 1: Folder directory of all the applications in the devices.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section describes the potential artefacts found in each mVoIP applica-
tion’s directory. Furthermore, we discuss the evidentiary values of the artefacts
found for each of the mVoIP applications.
4.1. Viber Artefacts
This subsection describes the Viber artefacts found in both manual forensic
analysis and using IEF tool. We found two unique database directories after
examining dd image with the FTK imager for Viber application, which are:
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• [root]/data/com.viber.voip/databases/viber data.db
• [root]/data/com.viber.voip/databases/viber messages.db
The Viber application has two databases: viber data.db, which contains
the same information as wa.db in WhatsApp; and viber messages.db, which
has the same information as msgstore.db in WhatsApp application. Once
again, using rooted device enabled us to access the database information in
plaintext format. The viber data.db file contains data related to the outgoing
calls, Viber contact names and numbers. In this experiment, we considered no
blocked numbers; however, in case of having some block numbers, they would be
recoverable as well. All these potential artefacts have evidentiary value relevant
to a forensic investigation. On the other hand, the viber messages.db file
stores geographical location information, contacts and all the sent or received
messages in a chat database. Through preforming a forensic examination on
this database, one would be able to determine the message exchange and also
the actual source and destination of each exchanged message. With the aid of
the IEF forensic tool, it is possible to determine whether a particular message
was either sent or received by a particular sender or a recipient. These artefacts
are useful in helping a forensic investigator to determine if a particular suspect
is worth taking to court.
4.2. Skype Artefacts
In order to examine the Skype application, after obtaining the dd image in
the same way as Viber and WhatsApp, we used the IEF tool. We discovered
that, Skype stores information in an SQLite database called main.db, and the
file directory is: [root]/data/com.skype.raider/files/SkypeID/main.db, in
which the “SkypeID” indicates a particular user account. The database contains
information about a user’s account such as messages, calls, group chat, voice-
mails, contacts, SMS messages and file transfers. We analyzed the main.db with
the SQLite viewer. The timestamp was in Unix epoch time but later converted
using the converting tool. Recoverable artefacts from the Skype contact lists
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include the Skype name, full name, birthday, gender, country, mobile number,
email address and registered date timestamp. Text-chat artefacts include the
text message, message type, status, chat ID and recipient ID. The call related
artefacts that could be recovered are: the local user details, remote user details,
call duration and whether the call was incoming or outgoing. The artefacts
related to file transfer that we could recover are: timestamp, file size(bytes) and
status. Voicemail related artefacts include: the caller’s ID, voicemail size and
status. Finally, IP location related artefacts included the userID, IP Address,
and timestamp.
Most people actually believe that by physically deleting or clearing chat his-
tories, the Skype logs will be deleted, and the data associated with a particular
account cannot be recovered. In mobile devices, evidential data that contains
such recoverable artefacts can prove fruitful and provide a rich source of evidence
for investigating crimes related to Skype. The artefacts showing an incoming
and an outgoing call have timestamps which are also captured along with the
call duration. With such evidence, a suspect cannot deny initiating or engaging
in such a call. This would give forensic examiners a stronger convincing power
in the court of law when handling a case. Moreover, it is possible to recover
full contact details of the Skype owner, i.e., full name, date of birth, phone
number(if any), date of Skype creation, and email; this makes it easy for the
suspect in question to be tracked down. The IP address reflects the “externally
visible” IP address of the device where Skype is running, i.e., the IP address
of the outermost NAT gateway connecting the device to the Internet. The IP
address plays a significant role in terms of determining the geographical loca-
tion of parties involved in the crime. This artefact can be useful for attribution
as it indicates the IP address that the device used to connect to the Internet.
This may help tie a subject to a particular IP address and activity originating
from that address. Having found artefacts like name, email, mobile number,
date of birth, gender and country, it would be easy for a forensic investigator to
further carry out the investigation based on what has been found and also to
geographically point to where the relevant subjects reside.
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4.3. WhatsApp Artefacts
In this subsection, we describe the WhatsApp Messenger artefacts that we
found in this investigation. In fact, by examining the dd image with the FTK
imager tool, we found out three unique directories: two of them are databases,
while one is a directory path.
• [root]/data/com.whatsapp/files/Avatars/60xxxx@s.whatsapp.net
• [root]/data/com.whatsapp/databases/wa.db
• [root]/data/com.whatsapp/databases/msgstore.db
We could find the avatar icon of each contact in the WhatsApp application,
along with user related MD5 and SHA1 hashes which have evidentiary value,
since they can be directly linked to a particular WhatsApp account, and hence
can be used to identify the user who is using this account. Alongside the avatar
pictures, the name and phone number of the user are also valuable to forensic
specialists.
Since we used a rooted device in the experiments, the database appeared in
plain text format. We discovered that, the records and logs of all the activities
carried out by the user that are listed in Table 5 are stored in two different
database files: wa.db, and msgstore.db. The wa.db file contains all the in-
formation relating to the contacts including the contact names, contact phone
numbers and WhatsApp status. These artefacts can be of great value to actu-
ally track down suspects, for example, a certain WhatsApp status update may
betray information relating to a criminal activity. Having these kind of arte-
facts, a digital forensic specialist would be able to potentially relate the status
to an actual incident and back up their case accordingly. On the other hand, the
msgstore.db contains artefacts with timestamps relating to sent and received
text-chat messages, images, videos and audios. By analyzing the same database
using IEF tool, we could obtain the source and the destination of each message
in order to detect the actual sender and receiver of each message.
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We summarized the results acquired from our investigation in Table 6. Both
WhatsApp Messenger and Viber share almost the same potential evidentiary
artefacts, however in WhatsApp Messenger, there is neither call duration, nor
GPS coordination. Skype leaves more interesting artefacts, such as both local
and private IP addresses which are capable of facilitating further investigation
on a particular case.
So far only a few research studies have explored and addressed the forensic
recovery and analysis of activities carried out on social network and instant mes-
saging applications on smartphones. These work provide limited information in
terms of logical acquisition and artefacts recovery. In contrary, our study ex-
plored the forensic acquisition, examination and analysis of the logical image of
a smartphone. Our experiment consisted of: i) installation of three top-rated
mVoIP applications, ii) carrying out the usual user activities on each of these
applications, followed by the acquisition of the logical image using a forensically
sound approach, and iii) performing a manual forensic analysis on each of the
installed mVoIP applications. When carrying out such a digital forensic exam-
ination, however, there could be some potential obstacles which could make
accurate data recovery difficult. For example, there are many varieties of lock
screen apps, app lock, SMS and picture locks; some of which encrypt the data
stored on the mobile device, and also lock the device interface [68]. This could
be an issue for a digital forensic specialist when examining such a device.
Table 6: Summary of potential found evidentiary artefacts.
mVoIP Application
Potential Evidentiary Artefacts Viber Skype WhatsApp
Messages X X X
Contact Details X X X
Phone Number X X X
Voicemail X
Email X
Images, Videos, Audios X X X
Location Information X X
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we carried out a forensic analysis of the most popular mVoIP
applications, i.e., Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp Messenger when running on an
Android smartphone. Artefacts listed in Table 6 can provide vital evidence that
can open up a case or offer a wealth of information for further investigation
when dealing with crime related to mobile devices and mobile applications.
This study successfully applies a methodology adapted from an existing dig-
ital forensics framework, which uses various techniques from the existing liter-
ature, in order to perform a forensic analysis of Viber, Skype, and WhatsApp
Messenger applications on an Android platform. We showed that potential ev-
identiary artefacts can be found on Android devices, which have forensic value
to be presented in the court of law by a forensic investigator when handling a
case related to cyber terrorism or cybercrime conspiracies. A possible future
research direction could be a comprehensive research on different mobile oper-
ating system platforms, considering another mVoIP apps. This would provide
vital information for digital forensic specialists.
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